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Abstract

Previous application of value-of-information methods to optimal clinical
trial design have predominantly taken a societal decision-making perspective, implicitly assuming that healthcare costs are covered through public
expenditure and trial research is funded by government or donation-based
philanthropic agencies. In this paper, we consider the interaction between
interrelated perspectives of a societal decision maker (e.g. the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [NICE] in the UK) charged with the
responsibility for approving new health interventions for reimbursement and
the company that holds the patent for a new intervention. We establish optimal decision making from societal and company perspectives, allowing for
trade-offs between the value and cost of research and the price of the new
intervention.
Given the current level of evidence, there exists a maximum (threshold)
price acceptable to the decision maker. Submission for approval with prices
above this threshold will be refused. Given the current level of evidence and
the decision maker’s threshold price, there exists a minimum (threshold) price
acceptable to the company. If the decision maker’s threshold price exceeds the
company’s, then current evidence is sufficient since any price between the
thresholds is acceptable to both. On the other hand, if the decision maker’s
threshold price is lower than the company’s, then no price is acceptable to
both and the company’s optimal strategy is to commission additional research. The methods are illustrated using a recent example from the literature.

Key points for decision makers
 Based on current evidence, there exists a maximum price acceptable to the decision maker
and a minimum price acceptable to the company
 If the decision maker’s maximum price exceeds the company’s minimum price, then no further
evidence is required, since any price in-between is acceptable to both
 If the company’s maximum price exceeds the decision maker’s minimum price, collecting
further evidence is optimal for both
 The decision maker’s and company’s optimal study design to collect further evidence will differ
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Recently, there has been much interest in using
value-of-information methods to determine optimal
sample size for randomized controlled trials.[1-28]
Value-of-information methods are proposed as an
alternative to traditional Frequentist approaches,
which are based on tests of hypotheses and arbitrarily determined quantities such as the type I
and II error probabilities and the smallest clinically
important difference. Using value-of-information
methods, the sample size that maximizes the expected net gain (ENG) can be determined, where
the ENG is the difference between the expected
value of the (sample) information provided by a
trial and the expected total cost (ETC). If the
maximum ENG is negative, decision making can
be made based on current information, adopting
the new intervention if, and only if, the expected
incremental net benefit (INB) is positive. On the
other hand, if the maximum ENG is positive,
then a trial is worthwhile, with the optimal sample
size being that which maximizes the ENG.
Taking a societal perspective, where healthcare costs are covered through public expenditure
and trial research is funded by government or
donation-based philanthropic agencies, Willan and
Pinto[20] provide a solution for optimal sample
size under restrictive assumptions. Subsequent
papers[6-9,23,24] provide solutions with the assumptions relaxed.
Industry perspectives can also been taken. Gittins
and Pezeshk,[11,12] Kikuchi et al.,[16] Pezeshk and
Gittins[17] and Pezeshk[18] used a decision-theoretic
approach to determine optimal sample size under
the assumptions that the number of patients receiving the new intervention is a function of the
observed size of the treatment effect and the
associated statistical significance. Willan[22] provides a solution for optimal sample size from an
industrial perspective, in which the value of the
information from a new trial relates to the expected increase in the probability of regulatory
approval and market share.
The purpose of this paper is to establish a valueof-information framework for exploring the interaction between the interrelated perspectives of
a societal decision maker (e.g. the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [NICE]
in the UK) and a company that submits evidence
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in support of a new intervention for the purposes
of supporting the approval of the new intervention
for reimbursement. As discussed by Eckermann
and Willan[6,8] and Griffin et al.,[29] approving a
new intervention based solely on the criterion
that the current estimate of INB is positive ignores
the uncertainty associated with the estimate.
From a societal perspective, it will be optimal
to undertake further research if the expected value
of information from such research exceeds the
expected opportunity cost (EOC). Current evidence is sufficient (i.e. adopting now is optimal)
only if for any potential research design the expected cost of research exceeds its expected value.
Expected value of research falls as positive INB
becomes more certain, or as the price of the new
intervention is reduced. The EOC of research
increases as expected INB increases or as price
reduces. Consequently, given the option for the
decision maker to request additional research,
our framework can be used to establish a stricter
criterion for current evidence of INB and the
price at which adopting is optimal, allowing for
the uncertainty associated with current evidence.
Assuming that the decision maker and the
company are acting optimally and are risk neutral, the framework can also be used to establish
the maximum (threshold) price of the intervention
acceptable to the decision maker and a minimum
(threshold) price acceptable to the company.
If the decision maker’s threshold price exceeds
the company’s, then the current evidence is sufficient for decision making since any price between the two thresholds is acceptable to both.
On the other hand, if the company’s threshold
price exceeds the decision maker’s, then no price
is acceptable to both and, as we subsequently
demonstrate, the company’s optimal strategy is
to collect additional evidence prior to submitting
for approval.
Consider the perspective of a societal decision
maker who is charged with the responsibility of
deciding whether or not to add a new intervention to the formulary for reimbursement at a given
price. The decision maker can accept the new intervention, reject it outright or request additional
research. To the decision maker, the value of
additional research is the expected reduction in
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opportunity loss from making decisions in the
face of uncertain INB. However, assuming it is
infeasible to accept the new intervention while
research is undertaken, there is also an EOC to
the decision maker of delaying the decision, since
denying the new intervention to patients until the
evidence is updated forgoes expected INB of
the new intervention. We show that as the price
of the new intervention increases, the value of
additional research increases, while the opportunity cost decreases. Consequently, there exists a
threshold price for the societal decision maker,
above which the expected value of sample information (EVSI) from additional evidence exceeds
its expected cost, i.e. the ENG from additional
evidence is positive.
The other perspective to consider is that of
the company requesting that the intervention be
added to the formulary for reimbursement. The
company incurs a financial cost of conducting
further research and an opportunity cost from
revenue foregone while the research is conducted.
The value of additional research, from a company perspective, relates to expected increase in
the decision maker’s threshold price associated
with a reduction in uncertainty and, as we subsequently show, decreases as the price increases.
We also show that as the price increases, the cost
in foregone revenue increases. Hence, as the price
of the intervention increases over the range for
which expected net benefit is positive, the ENG of
additional evidence from the company’s perspective decreases due to both increasing cost and
falling value. Therefore, for the company, there
exists a threshold price below which the value of
new evidence exceeds its cost, i.e. the ENG is
positive, making additional research worthwhile.
If the company’s maximum (with respect to
research design) ENG is positive with the price
set at the decision maker’s threshold (or, equivalently, if the company’s threshold price exceeds
that of the decision maker), then further research
is optimal from the company’s perspective. That
is, where there is positive ENG of further research
for the company with the price set low enough to
be acceptable to the decision maker, no common
price exists at which both parties would prefer to
add the intervention to the formulary. Converse-
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ly, if the company’s maximum ENG is negative
with the price set to the decision maker’s threshold price, then it will be optimal to submit a
proposal for approval at the decision maker’s
threshold price rather than commission further
research.
1. Methods
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1.1 Incremental Net Benefit and Expected
Value of Information

Consider the cost-effectiveness assessment of a
new healthcare intervention, referred to as
Treatment (T), versus the appropriate comparator, referred to as Standard (S). Let eji, j = T, S be
the (clinical) effectiveness for patient i receiving
intervention j and let cji, j = T, S be the total
healthcare cost for patient i receiving intervention
j. The cost cTi includes the price of the new intervention for patients receiving Treatment. Let
ej = E(eji), cj = E(cji), De = eT - eS and Dc = cT - cS,
where E( ) is the expected value function. If l is
the decision maker’s threshold value for a unit of
effectiveness, then the INB (b) ¼ De l  Dc . Now,
if we separate out the price of the new intervention from other costs in the notation, we can explore the consequences of allowing it to vary. If
the per-patient price of the new intervention (i.e.
revenue per patient to the company) equals R,

¼ cTi  R is the healthcare cost for pathen cTi
tient i receiving Treatment, excluding the price of
the new intervention, where price is assumed to
be the same for all patients. Furthermore, let
cT ¼ cT  R, Dc ¼ Dc  R and b  ¼ De l  Dc .
We assume that the decision maker’s threshold
value is known to the company.
Suppose that a societal decision maker is
charged with the task of deciding whether or not
to approve a submission from a company to have
the new intervention added to the formulary for
reimbursement at a price of R. The current evidence in support of the new intervention, relative
to the appropriate comparator, is expressed as a
Normal probability distribution function for the
INB, with mean b0 and variance v0. That is,
b0 ¼ De0 l  Dc0 and
v0 ¼ ve0 l2 þ vc0  2lcec0
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where, based on current evidence, De0 and Dc0 are
the means and ve0 and vc0 the variance of De and
Dc, respectively, and cec0 is the co-variance between De and Dc. Let b0 ¼ b0 þ R. The assumption of Normality is applied to INB and not to
the individual patient observations, as illustrated in the section 2 example, where Binomial
and Gamma models are assumed for effectiveness
and cost, respectively. If b0 £ 0, it is optimal for
the decision maker to refuse approval or request a
price reduction. If b0 > 0, potentially optimal decisions are to approve reimbursement, request a
price reduction prior to approval, or request additional research.
Assuming that the additional evidence is from
a randomized controlled trial in which the cost
and effectiveness are observed on n patients per
arm (Treatment and Standard), the EVSI of the
trial to the societal decision maker (EVSId) is given by Willan and Pinto[20] and Eckermann and
Willan[7] as:

the evidence is updated, given by Eckermann and
Willan[7] as:


EOCd ðnÞ ¼ ð þ 2n=aÞk  n b0

Therefore, the ENG to the decision maker
(ENGd) of another trial of n patients per arm,
defined as EVSId – EOCd, is given by equation c
in figure 1.
Let ENGd(n) be maximized at nR . If ENGd ðnR Þ
is positive, then the optimal decision is to delay
approval and request another trial with nR
patients per arm. On the other hand, if ENGd ðnR Þ
is negative, then, if b0 is positive, the optimal decision is to approve the intervention for reimbursement at a price of R. The subscript R in the notation
for optimal sample size is a reminder that the optimal sample size depends on the submitted price.
Griffin et al.[29] provided a criterion similar to
equation c in figure 1 for choosing between
adoption and rejection that allows for uncertainty as to whether or not additional research will be
conducted. However, they use the current expected value of perfect information (EVPI), rather
than the EVSI, as the value of additional research. EVPI does not allow for optimal decision
making, since it over-estimates value of research
and has no defined relationship to EVSI, let alone
ENG which is required for optimal decision making. Hence, Eckermann et al.[10] show that use of
EVPI in prioritizing research can easily lead to
support for research with negative ENG, while
also failing to support research with high research
return despite small EVPI.
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EVSId ðnÞ ¼ NðnÞ D  F ðnÞ

(see equation a of figure 1).
The terms D and F ðnÞ are the pre- and posttrial per-patient expected opportunity loss, respectively. Their difference is the amount by
which the per-patient expected opportunity loss is
reduced by the trial evidence and, when multiplied
by the number of patients who can benefit, yields
the EVSI. Where b0 > 0, the difference D  F ðnÞ,
which is the per-patient EVSI [EVSIpp(n)], simplifies to equation b in figure 1.
If h, expressed in years, is the time horizon for
the new intervention, k the annual incidence of
the health condition in question, a the annual
patient accrual rate and t, expressed in years, the
duration from when the last patient is recruited
until the evidence is updated, then, as given in
Eckermann and Willan,[7] the number of patients
to whom the decision applies is given by:


NðnÞ ¼ h  ð þ 2n=aÞ k

If the trial is undertaken by the company, the
only cost to the decision maker is the EOC
(EOCd) incurred by those patients who are denied
the intervention while the trial is performed and
Adis ª 2012 Springer International Publishing AG. All rights reserved.

1.2 The Decision Maker’s Threshold Price

By substituting b0  R for b0, where b0 > 0, the
ENG can be seen as a function of n and R, given
as equation d in figure 1.
Since, if all other variables are held constant,
the EVSId is an increasing function of R and
EOCd is a decreasing function of R, there exists a
decision maker’s threshold price, denoted R~ d0 ,
such that if R < R~ d0 , ENGd ðnR Þ is negative, while
if R > R~ d0 , ENGd ðnR Þ is positive. Therefore, if
R  R~ d0 , the ENG for another trial is negative,
regardless of its size, and the optimal decision for
the decision maker is to approve the intervention
Pharmacoeconomics 2012; 30 (6)
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a

NðnÞ is the number of patients to whom the decision applies;
D¼

pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ





pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
v0 =ð2Þ exp  b20 ð2v0 Þ  b0 Fð  b0 = v0 Þ  I ðb0  0Þ ;

F ðnÞ ¼

pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ 2



v0 =ð2Þ þ exp  b20 2v0 ðnvÞ
. pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ



3=2
 b0 F  b0 v0 þ v0 exp  b20 2v0
v 2

 2 .pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
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2
2v
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s2þ ¼ VðeTi l  cTi Þ þ VðeSi l  cSi Þ is the sum over treatment groups of the between-patient
variance of net benefit;

v ¼ v0 þ s2þ n;

FðÞ is the Cumulative distribution function for the standard Normal random variable; and

IðÞ is the indicator function.

b

.pﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ



pﬃﬃﬃ
2v  b0 F  b0 v v0
EVSIpp ðnÞ ¼ v0 exp  b20 v ð2v20 Þ

c


 
 

ENGd ðnÞ ¼ h  ð þ 2n=aÞ k D  F ðnÞ  ð þ 2n=aÞk  n b0

d

e

ENGd ðn; RÞ ¼ EVSId ðn; RÞ  EOCd ðn; RÞ
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^  Þ  2lCð
^ e ; D^  Þ ¼ 0:003356l2 þ 4320  2lð 0:6870Þ
^ D
^ D^ e Þl2 þ Vð
^ D
Variance v0 ¼ Vð
c
c
h

ENGc ðmÞ ¼
n
R~ c0 ¼





h  ð þ 2m=aÞ k EðR~ dm Þ  hkR~ d0 U  ðCf þ 2mCv Þ

. o
h  ð þ 2mR~ d  aÞ k EðR~ dm  ÞU  ðCf þ 2mR~ d Cv Þ
R~ d
0

0

0

hk

Fig. 1. Equations. Continued next page.
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Fig. 1. Continued. Refer to the text for parameter and abbreviation definitions.

for reimbursement at a price of R. On the other
hand, if R > R~ d0 , the optimal decision is to request
evidence from another trial, with nR per arm, or
to request a reduction in the price to no more
than R~ d0 .
Since R~ d0 is the maximum price acceptable to
the decision maker, then bd0 ¼ b0  R~ d0 is the
minimum acceptable INB, referred to as the
threshold INB. Therefore, because of the unAdis ª 2012 Springer International Publishing AG. All rights reserved.

certainty, the criterion for adoption should be
b0 > bd0 rather than b0 > 0, where b0 is the estimate
of INB based on some price R, i.e. b0 ¼ b0  R.
Note that b0 > bd0 is equivalent to R < R~ d0 :
1.3 The Company’s Threshold Price

The maximum price the company can receive
following a trial of m patients per arm is R~ dm , the
Pharmacoeconomics 2012; 30 (6)
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post-trial threshold price for the decision maker.
Therefore, for a company facing a price of R, the
EVSI is the increase in the post-trial revenue per
patient, given by:
EVSIc ðm; RÞ


 
¼ h  ð þ 2m=aÞ k EðR~ dm Þ  R

which is simply the post-trial time horizon multiplied by the incidence and the expected increase in
price. All other variables constant, EVSIc(m,R) is
a decreasing function of R.
The financial cost to the company of performing a trial with m patients per arm is given
by Cf + 2mCv, where Cf is the fixed cost and Cv
the per-patient variable cost of performing the
trial. The EOC of foregone revenue experienced
by the company, facing a price of R, is given by
ð þ 2m=aÞkR, which is simply the duration of the
trial multiplied by the incidence and the price.
Therefore, the ETC for the company (ETCc) is
given by:
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ENG for another trial is negative and the optimal
decision for the company is to submit for approval at an expected price of R~ d0 . On the other
hand, if R~ d0 < R~ c0 , the maximum ENG for another
trial is positive and the optimal decision for the
company is to perform another trial with a sample
size of mR~ d and submit for approval at a price of
0
R ¼ R~ dm when the evidence is updated.
R~ d
0
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ETCc ðm; RÞ ¼ Cf þ 2mCv þ ð þ 2m=aÞkR

All other variables held constant, ETCc(m,R)
is an increasing function of R. The ENG to the
company (ENGc) of a trial with m patients per
arm is given by equation e in figure 1.
Let ENGc (m,R) be maximized at mR . Since
EVSIc ðmR ; RÞ is a decreasing function of R and
ETCc ðmR ; RÞ is a increasing function of R, there
exists a company threshold price, denoted R~ c0 , such
that if R < R~ c0 , ENGc ðmR ; RÞ is positive, while if
R > R~ c0 , ENGc ðmR ; RÞ is negative. The threshold
price can be determined by setting ENGc ðmR ; RÞ
¼ 0 and solving for R, yielding:
R~ c0
¼



 
h  ð þ 2mR aÞ k EðR~ dm Þ  ðCf þ 2mR Cv Þ
R

hk

The threshold price R~ c0 depends on R, the price
the company faces, and, substituting the maximum pre-trial price the company faces, i.e. R~ d0 ,
the company threshold price is as displayed in
equation f in figure 1.
If the decision maker’s threshold price is greater than the company’s, i.e. R~ d0 > R~ c0 , the maximum
Adis ª 2012 Springer International Publishing AG. All rights reserved.

2. Example: The CADET-Hp Trial

The CADET-Hp (Canadian Adult Dyspepsia
Empiric Treatment–Helicobacter pylori-positive)
trial was a double-blind, placebo-controlled, parallelgroup, multi-centre, randomized controlled trial
performed in 36 family practitioner centres across
Canada. The results were published in Chiba
et al.[30,31] and Willan.[32] Patients aged 18 years
and over with uninvestigated dyspepsia of at least
moderate severity presenting to their family
physicians were eligible for randomization, provided they did not have any alarm symptoms and
were eligible for empiric drug therapy. Patients
were randomized between the following:
Treatment: Omeprazole 20 mg, metronidazole
500 mg and clarithromycin 250 mg; and
Standard: Omeprazole 20 mg, placebo metronidazole and placebo clarithromycin.
A total of 288 patients were randomized, 142
(= nT) to Treatment and 146 (= nS) to Standard.
Both regimens were given twice daily for 7 days.
The binary measure of effectiveness was treatment success, defined as the presence of no or minimal dyspepsia symptoms at 1 year. Costs were
determined from the societal perspective and are
given in $Can. A summary of the trial results are
given in table I.
Treatment was observed to increase the probability of treatment success by 13.71 percentage
points and reduce total cost by $Can75.30 per
patient, excluding the price of metronidazole and
clarithromycin. If we assume a Normal flat prior
for INB, and assume that the estimator of INB
from this trial is Normally distributed, then the
current evidence in favour of Treatment will be
based solely on the data from this trial, and
will be characterized by a Normal distribution for
Pharmacoeconomics 2012; 30 (6)
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Table I. Parameter estimates for the CADET-Hp triala
Treatment

Standard

142

146

Proportion of successes ð ¼ e^ j Þ

0.507

0.3699

Difference = 0.1371 ð ¼ D^ e Þ

Estimate of mean cost minus cost of metronidazole and clarithromycinb

Estimated variance of proportion of successes ð ¼ e^ j ð1  e^ j Þ nj Þ

459.50

534.80

Difference = -75.30 ð ¼ D^ c Þ

0.00176

0.001596

Sum = 0.003356 ð ¼ V^ ðD^ e ÞÞ

1825

2495

Sum = 4320 ð ¼ V^ ðD^ c ÞÞ

-0.2837

-0.4033

^ D^ e ; D^  ÞÞ
Sum = -0.6870 ð ¼ Cð
c

Sample size ( = nj)

Estimated variance of average cost

b
b

Estimated co-variance between proportion of successes and average cost
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a

y^ is an estimate of y.

b

Using a Gamma model.

INB with mean and variance as presented in
equation g in figure 1, where l is the threshold
value for the willingness-to-pay for a treatment
success. Assume an h of 10 years, a k of 80 000, an
a of 800 and a duration of 1.5 years for follow-up
and data analysis (t). A plot of the decision maker’s threshold price ðR~ d0 Þ as a function of the
threshold value of a treatment success (l) is given
in figure 2. The quantity R~ d0 is the maximum
price at which the decision maker would approve
now in preference to requesting another trial,
and increases with the threshold value for a treatment success. Also given in figure 2 is the plot
of the threshold INB, i.e. bd0 ¼ b0  R~ d0 . For l =
$Can500, the threshold decision maker’s price is

$Can106.53, and the threshold INB is $Can37.32.
Thus the decision maker would approve for reimbursement if the submitted price is less than
$Can106.53 or, equivalently, if the mean INB is
greater than $Can37.32.
A plot of the decision maker’s optimal sample
size ð ¼ nR Þ as a function of price (R) is given in
figure 3 for l = $Can500. At a price less than or
equal to $Can106.53 ð ¼ R~ d0 Þ, Treatment would be
approved for reimbursement; see figure 2. At the
other end of the scale, if the price exceeds
$Can143.85, approval would be refused since
mean INB (b0) would be negative. For a price
between $Can106.53 and $Can143.85 the decision maker would request another trial, with the
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Fig. 2. The decision maker’s threshold price (R~ 0d ) and threshold mean incremental net benefit b0d ¼ ðb0  R~ 0d Þ as a function of the threshold
value for treatment success (l), for the CADET-Hp Trial. At a threshold value for treatment success of $Can500, the decision maker’s threshold
price and threshold mean incremental net benefit are $Can106.53 and $Can37.32, respectively.
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3. Extensions

400 395
375 387

3.1 Partial Revenue per Patient

350
325
300
275
250
225

245
106.53

140.67

143.85

In sections 1 and 2, it was assumed that the
revenue per patient received by the company is
equal to the price. It is more realistic to assume
that the revenue per patient to the company is,
instead, a fraction, U, of the price, in which case
the ENG and the threshold price to the company
become equation h in figure 1.
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100 105 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150
Price ($Can)

Fig. 3. Optimal sample size ðnR Þ as a function of price (R) for
a threshold value for treatment success (l) of $Can500. The decision maker approves for R < $Can106.53; refuses approval for
R > $Can143.85; and requests another trial for $Can106.53
£ R £ $Can143.85.

size of the trial increasing with R over this range,
as the INB falls towards zero at R = $Can143.85.
For example, at a submitted price of $Can140.67,
the decision maker would request a trial of 387
patients per arm. Given the societal decision maker’s
threshold price with current evidence, the company’s
optimal behaviour is to submit a request with the
price set to $Can106.53 ð ¼ R~ d0 Þ, unless there exists a
sample size such that their ENGc is positive.
For l = $Can500 and Cf and Cv cost of
$Can800 000 and $Can2000 respectively, table II
contains, from the company’s perspective, the
EVSIc, the total cost (TCc) and the ENGc for
various sample sizes. Also given in table II is the
post-trial expected
threshold price for the deci
sion maker EðR~ dm Þ , which was determined by
numerical integration; see the Appendix. The optimal sample size lies between 100 and 200 patients
per arm. A more exhaustive search reveals that
the optimal sample size is 137 patients per arm,
corresponding to a pre-trial threshold price to the
company ðR~ c0 Þ of $Can113.06 and an ENG to the
company of $Can6 451 162. The expected threshold price for the decision
 maker following a trial
of 137 patients per arm EðR~ d137 Þ is $Can140.67.
By contrast, a pre-trial submission by the company at a price of $Can140.67 would precipitate
a request from the decision maker for a trial
with 387 patients per arm (see figure 3), which is
associated with an ENG to the company of only
$Can1 170 179; see table II.
Adis ª 2012 Springer International Publishing AG. All rights reserved.

3.2 Discounting

In sections 1, 2 and 3.1, a discount rate of zero
is assumed. A discount rate of r > 0 requires the
following adjustments to the formulations for the
ENG for the decision maker and company
(ENGd and ENGc, respectively) and threshold
price to the company ðR~ c0 Þ, as given in equation i
in figure 1, where t ¼ 2n=a þ  is the trial duration; tL is the integer part of t; tU = tL + 1; ta = 2n/a
is the duration of patient accrual; and tLa is the
as shown in equation j in figure 1,
integer part of ta .
where t* ¼ 2mR~ d a þ  is the optimal trial dura0

tion; t*L is the integer part of t*; t*U ¼ t*L þ 1;

Table II. From the company’s perspective, the expected value of
sample information, total cost and expected net gain and the decid
sion maker’s expected threshold price (E ðR~ m
Þ) as a function of
sample size, for the CADET-Hp Trial
m

EVSIc

TCc

ENGc

d
E ðR~ m
Þ

50

18 252 845

14 650 000

3 602 845

100

20 539 382

15 900 000

4 639 382

136.12

137a

23 276 162

16 825 000

6 451 162

140.67

150

22 530 291

17 150 000

5 380 291

139.66

200

24 796 479

18 400 000

6 396 479

143.74

250

23 679 076

19 650 000

4 029 076

142.59

300

24 283 713

20 900 000

3 383 713

144.17

350

23 325 027

22 150 000

1 175 027

143.24

387b

24 245 179

23 075 000

1 170 179

145.23

400

24 126 392

23 400 000

726 392

145.21

450

23 085 097

24 650 000

-1 564 903

144.13

a


137 ¼ mR~ d ¼ m106:53

b


387 ¼ nR~ c ¼ n140:67

132.24

0

137

d
= from the decision maker’s perspective; ENGc = expected net gain
from the company’s perspective; EVSIc = expected value of sample
information from the company’s perspective; m = sample size per
arm; R = price; TCc = total cost from the company’s perspective.
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.
ta ¼ 2mR~ d a is the duration of patient accrual;
0


and tL
a is the integer part of ta .

3.3 Positive Cost of Adoption

In sections 1, 2, 3.1 and 3.2, the cost of adopting the new intervention is assumed to be zero.
Let CA be the cost of adopting Treatment. It is
reasonable to assume that the adoption of a new
healthcare intervention will incur some upfront
costs, such as those associated with conveying
public health messages, training and learning by
doing as well as capital equipment. For a positive
CA, it can be shown that the formulations for DðRÞ,
F ðn; RÞ and EOCd (n) become equation k in figure 1.

different. Value of information (the option value
of delay) arises for all patients beyond the point
that evidence is updated, while an opportunity
cost of INB arises for all patients except those on
the treatment arm of the trial, until evidence is
updated.[6-8] Consequently, a trade-off between
value of information and opportunity cost needs
to consider time and population differences.
Furthermore, value of information from delaying
should be the EVSI of an optimal trial, rather
than EVPI, given evidence. The expected opportunity loss of adoption is the EVSI provided by
an optimal trial, not the EVPI. Griffin et al.[29]
extended their methods to account for changing
populations and consider the role of additional
research. However, they still quantified the value
of additional research as the EVPI, rather than
the EVSI as required by optimal decision making,
which we have addressed as part of this paper.
In this paper, we have established and illustrated the appropriate trade-off between pricing
and the level of evidence relevant to the societal
decision of whether to approve healthcare interventions for reimbursement when companies
have sole remit to commission trials. For a given
level of evidence, it has been illustrated that there
exists a maximum threshold price ‘acceptable’ to
the societal decision maker. For prices above this
threshold, the ENG for the decision maker from
another trial is positive and requesting another
trial is their optimal strategy.
Furthermore, we have shown that the optimal
response of manufacturers to the societal threshold price of whether to undertake further research or lower their price depends on their
expected value of research and cost of research
and current evidence. Given current evidence,
there exists a minimum threshold price ‘acceptable’ to the company, meaning that for prices
below the threshold, the ENG for the company
from another trial is positive and performing
another trial is their optimal strategy. The company’s threshold price exceeds that of the decision maker if, and only if, there exists a sample
size for which the company’s ENG is positive.
The optimal strategy for a company is to submit for approval at the decision maker’s threshold price when the company’s ENG is negative
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4. Discussion

Previous application of value-of-information
methods to optimal trial design have predominantly taken a societal decision-making perspective, implicitly assuming that society commissions
prospective trials and decides whether or not to
adopt new health interventions. Eckermann and
Willan[6-9] demonstrate that optimal societal decision making and trial design require joint consideration of whether to commission another trial
or adopt the new intervention, given that the value,
cost and feasibility of performing another trial
are determined by whether or not the new intervention is adopted. Optimal decision making is
shown to require a comparison of ENG for delaying the decision regarding adoption and performing another trial versus adopting immediately with no trial within jurisdiction, with the
additional consideration of ENG for adopting
and trialling, where feasible, across jurisdictions.
Griffin et al.[29] suggested that, where societal
decision making is restricted to adopting or rejecting, the decision could influence manufacturers
through a trade-off between the price of, and level
of evidence for, a new intervention. The trade-off
they suggest is between EVPI and INB, where
EVPI is suggested as the opportunity cost of adopting and INB the opportunity cost of delaying.
However, the populations to which the value of
information and the opportunity costs apply are

Adis ª 2012 Springer International Publishing AG. All rights reserved.
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for all sample sizes at this price, or to perform
another trial when the maximum ENG for the
company is positive. From the company perspective, the optimal sample size of the trial will be
that which maximizes their ENG, given the value
and cost of trials and revenue foregone. In general, it is suboptimal for the company to submit
for approval at a price greater than the decision
maker’s threshold, since, at best, it will precipitate a request for another trial with, from their
perspective, suboptimal sample size.
Thus, the incentives implicit in the framework
presented here discourage the company from
submitting for approval until there is sufficient
evidence to support the submitted price. This
reduces administrative and analytic burden on decision makers and companies alike, in turn reducing
the associated transaction costs of the approval
process. Other considerations, such as the value
of being the first to market, the competing uses
of research funding or uncertainty in relation
to the threshold value of outcomes in a jurisdiction, may also influence the expected revenue
and cost of research trade-off faced by companies
in undertaking decision making. Hence, the
framework presented here could be generalized to
account for these additional factors where appropriate. Nevertheless, in general, the framework
enables optimal trade-offs between the value and
cost of further research from both societal and
company perspectives and establishes how these
trade-offs interact and play out in practice, where
companies have control of prospective research
and society has control of reimbursement within
a jurisdiction.
The analysis presented has been strictly within
jurisdiction. Moving beyond a strictly withinjurisdiction analysis, options arise in relation to
adopting and trialling, with the associated advantages in avoiding opportunity cost of delay, and
the potential for improving risk-sharing arrangements between companies and societal decision
makers.[9,10] Hence, further research is suggested
to extend the within-jurisdiction framework presented here and explore optimal mechanisms
for researching and pricing across jurisdictions,
given interactions between decision makers and
manufacturers and the potential to adopt and
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trial. This could, for example, consider incorporating contractual agreements to adjust pricing
in jurisdictions where such adoption is optimal
while additional evidence is collected in other
jurisdictions in which delaying and trialling is
optimal.
To apply a framework for optimal decision
making and interaction between societal decision
makers and companies, within or across jurisdictions, it is critical to establish economical and
meaningful societal threshold values for health
outcomes. Threshold values are required to determine the prior distribution of INB, the EVSI
and opportunity cost, as well as the consequent
threshold prices and optimal research decisions.
There is wide agreement that the threshold value
for health outcomes in societal decision making
should reflect the opportunity cost of funding
new interventions within a fixed budget and the
current use of existing interventions. Recently, it
has been suggested that, if the societal objective is
restricted to health maximization, the threshold
value for outcomes can be estimated as the shadow
price of the least cost-effective (worst performing) interventions to be displaced.[33-36] However,
even if the objective is restricted to health maximization, the shadow price of contracting or
displacing the least cost-effective interventions
will only coincide with that from the best expansion of current interventions (represented by the
opportunity cost from financing new interventions) when there is complete allocative efficiency
across all activities and interventions.[37,38] Hence,
with allocative inefficiency in the current healthcare system, the opportunity cost and threshold
price of, e.g., incremental dollars per QALY
gained will be lower than that of displacing the
least cost-effective services. Consequently, evidence
of the most cost-effective expansion of existing
technology is required to estimate the true opportunity cost and threshold values for INB so
that value-of-information methods can be appropriately applied.
Throughout the paper, we have assumed that
the parameters h, k, a and t are fixed, mostly to
focus the attention on the uncertainty regarding
INB. However, the uncertainty of such parameters could be added to the model. The parameters
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h, a and t would be amenable to sensitivity analyses, since they are somewhat in the control of the
investigators. On the other hand, the uncertainty
regarding k might be best incorporated by using a
Bayesian approach since its estimate would be
typically based on empirical evidence. We have
assumed that the prior- and post-study distributions for INB are derived from randomized controlled trials data. However, it is often the case, as
in decision-analytic models, for example, that
INB is a complex function of many parameters,
the information for which may come from a
variety of study types; see Ades et al.[1] This is
illustrated in Welton et al.,[19] who examined the
evidence in support of interventions for improving the uptake of breast cancer screening, and by
Brennan and Kharroubi,[39] who explored methods for EVSI determination for models with
Weibull survival parameters. Consequently, value
is suggested to extending the methods presented
in this paper for randomized controlled trials to
other research designs. Nonetheless, the principle
of applying value-of-information methods for the
pricing of new health interventions illustrated in
this paper is the same, regardless of the derivation
of INB.
The case for assuming Normality for mean
INB based on individual patient data has been
made by numerous authors, and has been generally accepted. The parametric assumption of
Bivariate Normality for mean cost and effectiveness (and hence, mean INB) has been shown to
perform well.[40-43] Alternative distributional assumptions for INB do not, in general, lead to
closed form solutions for the EVSI, requiring the
use of numerical integration or Markov ChainMonte Carlo methods. Consequently, the computer intensiveness of methods required with
alternative assumptions may prove to be particularly challenging.[1]
We have assumed that the company is risk
neutral, implying that if the company’s threshold
price exceeds the decision maker’s then it is optimal for the company to do additional research.
However, if the company is somewhat risk
averse, then they should be more willing at the
margin to accept the decision maker’s threshold
price based on current evidence. Hence, while

expected revenue associated with an expected increase in the decision maker’s threshold price
with additional evidence may be greater than the
company’s direct and opportunity costs, the riskaverse company may not be willing to risk that
actual net revenue could be reduced due to a potential price reduction with additional evidence.
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Appendix

R~ dm is the decision maker’s threshold price fol~d
lowing a trial of m patients per
 arm. That is, Rm is
that value of R, such that maxn fENGm ðn; RÞg
¼ 0, where ENGm(n,R) is the ENG of performing a trial of n patients per arm, once the evidence
is updated with data from the trial of m patients
per arm. Numerical integration with respect to
the distribution f is used to determine the expected
value of R~ dm ; where f is the probability distribution
function for the observed INB from the trial of
m patients per arm, which, under the assumptions
we have made, isNormal with mean b0 and variance v ¼ v0 þ 2þ m.
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